NASHVILLE--HOOD'S ARMY ROUTED

Defensive works of Nashville--Hood's lines--The ice
blockade--Halleck on remounts for cavalry--Pressing horses and its
abuse--The cavalry problem--Changes in organization--Assignment of
General Couch--Confederate cavalry at Nashville--Counter-movements
of our own--Detailed movements of our right--Difference of
recollection between Schofield and Wilson--The field
dispatches--Carrying Hood's works--Confederate rout.

At Nashville, when we reached there on the 1st of December, after
the battle of Franklin, we were left for a couple of days in
bivouac. The city had been covered by a line of interior earthworks,
suitable for a moderate garrison, with strong forts on commanding
hills. The Cumberland River, in its general course from east to
west, partially encloses the town on north and west by one of its
bends, and the Chattanooga Railroad runs out of the place not far
from the river, passing under St. Cloud Hill, on which was Fort
Negley, one of the strongest of the defensive works. Southwest of
this, about eight hundred yards, was the Casino block-house on a
still higher eminence, and some five hundred yards northwest of the
Casino was Fort Morton, on a summit connected with the other. My
division was assigned to the line including these forts, which
formed the strong southern salient of the original city defences.
Other troops of our corps continued the line on my left to the
river, and Steedman's division was placed in advance of the left,
along Brown's Creek, which was crossed by the Murfreesborough
turnpike. From Fort Morton the original works continued
northwestwardly, skirting the city to the Hyde's Ferry turnpike.
[Footnote: Official Atlas, pl. lxxiii.] But the army now collected
needed more room, and instead of turning back at the Casino the line
was continued southwest till it reached a prominent hill near the
Hillsborough turnpike. There it turned to the northwest, following a
succession of hilltops to the river, enclosing the whole of the bend
in which the city was. The Fourth Corps occupied the part of the
line next to us on the right, and General A. J. Smith's detachment
of the Army of the Tennessee was on the right of all. Until the eve
of the battle of Nashville the cavalry were concentrated at
Edgefield, on the north side of the Cumberland.

Hood had followed us up promptly from Franklin, and established his
lines nearly parallel to ours on our centre and left, though they
were shorter in extent, and a wide space near the river on our right
was only occupied by his cavalry. In my own immediate front, looking
down from the Casino block-house, were the Nolensville and Franklin
turnpikes with the Alabama Railroad, along which we had retreated.
Near my right was the Middle Franklin turnpike, which goes
southward, a mile or two distant from the main road, into which it
comes again below Brentwood. It is known locally as the Granny White
pike. My headquarters were in rear of Fort Morton, at the dwelling
of Mrs. Bilbo, a large house with a pillared portico the full height
of the front. We had two rooms in the house for our clerical work,
and pitched our tents in the dooryard. A short walk along the ridge
led to the Casino, from which was a fine outlook southward and
eastward.

During the time of the ice blockade from the 9th of December to the
13th, the slopes in front of the lines were a continuous glare of
ice, so that movements away from the roads and broken paths could be
made only with the greatest difficulty and at a snail's pace. Men
and horses were seen falling whenever they attempted to move across
country. A man slipping on the hillside had no choice but to sit
down and slide to the bottom, and groups of men in the forts and
lines found constant entertainment in watching these mishaps. There
had been a mingling of snow and sleet with the rain which began on
the 8th, and this compacted into a solid ice sheet. On a level
country it would have caused much less trouble, but on the hills and
rolling country about Nashville manoeuvres were out of the question
for nearly a week.

The dissatisfaction of General Grant with the delay in taking the
aggressive had begun with the withdrawal from Franklin on the 1st.
Objections to waiting for new supplies of cavalry horses were not
peculiar to this campaign. The waste of animals had been a constant
source of complaint through the whole war. On the 5th Halleck made a
report to Grant that 22,000 new cavalry horses had been issued at
the posts where Thomas's forces were equipping, since September
20th. This was exclusive of those used in Kentucky or sent to
Sherman. "If this number," he said, "without any campaign is already
reduced to 10,000 mounted men, as reported by General Wilson, it may
be safely assumed that the cavalry of that army will never be
mounted, for the destruction of horses in the last two months has
there alone been equal to the remounts obtained from the entire
west." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 55.] It was
on this report that Stanton's famous dispatch was based, "If he
waits for Wilson to get ready, Gabriel will be blowing his last
horn." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 84.] Halleck repeated the same in
substance to Thomas, adding, "Moreover, you will soon be in the same
condition that Rosecrans was last year,--with so many animals that
you cannot feed them. Reports already come in of a scarcity of
forage." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 114.] Yet, to remove as far as
possible the causes of delay, Grant directed mounted men from
Missouri to be sent to Nashville, [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlv. pt. ii. p. 130.] and even the "pressing" of horses in Kentucky
was permitted, sure as it was to be abused in practice. This soon
brought protests from the leading loyal men of Louisville. Mr. Speed
(U. S. Attorney-General) and Mr. Ballard (afterward Judge of the U.
S. Courts) telegraphed Mr. Stanton, "Loaded country wagons with
produce for market are left in the road; milk-carts, drays, and
butchers' wagons are left in the street--their horses seized."
[Footnote: _Id_., p. 139.] Indeed, from the very beginning of the
war, the cavalry problem had been an insoluble one. Raw recruits
could not be made to take proper care of horses, to groom them, to
ride them with judgment, or to save their strength. We campaigned in
regions where forage was scarce and where it could not be brought up
from the rear. A big cavalry force would starve when not moving, yet
exaggerated reports of the enemy's mounted troops made a constant
clamor for more. [Footnote: An interesting contribution to the
practical discussion of the subject is found in Sherman's letter to
General Meigs, Quartermaster-General from Savannah, December 25th,
ending with, "If my cavalry cannot remount itself in the country, it
may go afoot." (Official Records, vol. xliv. p. 807.) For the
discussion of it in Rosecrans's campaign of '63, see _ante_, chap,
xxiii. See also Official Records, vol. xxiii. pt. ii. pp. 300, 320.]
The attempts to use them in large bodies were rarely successful, and
the more modest duties of outpost and patrol in connection with the
infantry columns were distasteful. All this knowledge, combined with
the special causes of impatience now existing, gave to Grant's
dispatches a more and more urgent tone, leading up to the "Delay no
longer" of the 11th. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xlv. pt. ii. pp. 70, 97,
143.] To judge fairly the attitude of both Grant and Thomas, this
must not be overlooked, whilst we must also remember that the new
element of the icy covering of the earth in the immediate vicinity
of Nashville was so exceptional that it was not appreciated or fully
understood at the East.

The halt at Nashville was the occasion for some temporary changes in
the organization of my division. Colonel Henderson had not fully
recovered from the ill-health which had interrupted the command of
his brigade, and having obtained a leave of absence to go home for a
few weeks, the command of this brigade remained with Colonel Stiles.
General Reilly also found the need of recuperation and was granted a
short leave. It happened that Colonel Doolittle, who had
distinguished himself in command of the post at Decatur, had got
back from a short absence, and reached Nashville after
communications with Murfreesborough were interrupted. Not being able
to join his proper command, I was glad to make arrangements to give
him temporary service with me and to renew the pleasant acquaintance
made on our journey from Georgia. He acted as chief of staff for a
few days till Reilly left, and I then assigned him to command
Reilly's brigade, where there was no officer of sufficient
experience. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. pp. 86,
187.]

Another change which occurred was among the general officers, and
strongly illustrated the chafing likely to arise under such
circumstances. In pursuance of a policy before mentioned, the War
Department was bringing pressure to bear upon officers to make them
accept any active service suitable to their rank, or resign and
leave room for promotions for others, since Congress refused to
enlarge the number of general officers. Major-General Darius N.
Couch had been, during the war, hitherto connected with the Army of
the Potomac, but had drifted out of active service and was "waiting
orders." Grant had suggested that he be sent to command the district
of Kentucky, relieving Burbridge, whose administration was not
satisfactory to the General-in-Chief. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 16,28.]
But political influences at Washington did not favor this change,
and Couch was ordered to report to General Thomas for duty, and by
him was sent to the Fourth Corps to report to General Stanley.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 58.] The latter
was just going on "sick leave" on account of his wound received at
Franklin, and without being assigned to any division, Couch, by
rank, assumed temporary command of the corps in the absence of the
regularly assigned commandant. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 72.] The
immediate result of this was to supersede Brigadier-General Wood,
who had been second in rank in the corps through the year, and was
one of the oldest officers in the Army of the Cumberland. In the
rearrangement of divisions when the temporary command would cease,
it would displace General Kimball, who was also one of the most
experienced brigadiers, and would reduce him to a brigade. The
dissatisfaction thus caused in Thomas's own department made him
transfer the problem to Schofield and the Army of the Ohio. Thomas
proposed to Couch to take a division, therefore, in the Twenty-third
Corps. [Footnote: _Ibid_.] Schofield was induced to consent to this,
as it was accompanied by an arrangement for the speedy organization
of a division of new troops, to which General Ruger could be
assigned whilst Couch should take that which Ruger now commanded.
When the new scheme was laid before Couch, he replied with dignity
that he would readily serve where he was ordered, but could not, of
his own election, take a position that would throw him into a lesser
command. The formal orders making the changes were then issued.
[Footnote: _Id_., pp. 86, 103, 104.] We had two good brigadiers in
our corps, who had recently proved their capacity to take the new
division,--Reilly, who had been distinguished in the battle of
Franklin, and Cooper, who had conducted his brigade by a most
perilous and circuitous retreat from Centerville to Nashville;
[Footnote: "Battle of Franklin," chap. vii. and p. 206.] but the
commissions of these dated only from the taking of Atlanta, and
being juniors on the list of general officers, their claims to the
larger command were not considered very strong.

My own position was the one most affected by the advent of a senior
in rank into the corps. I had been senior of the division commanders
in East Tennessee as well as in the Atlanta campaign, and actually
in command of the corps in the absence of its regular chief or his
assumption of still wider duties. As second in rank, one is
necessarily in confidential possession of much knowledge which he
would not otherwise have, for the possibility that accidents of the
campaign may throw the larger command upon him requires that he
should have the means of judgment and action in such an event. He is
therefore in much closer relations to his superiors than he would be
as division commander merely. Again in marches and in any scattering
of forces, as senior, his command will be extended over other
portions of the corps in the absence of the commander, and I had not
infrequently found myself in command of another division beside my
own, either by definite orders or by operation of the articles of
war. [Footnote: "Battle of Franklin," pp. 277, 278.] When to this is
added such command as fell to me in the October campaign in Georgia,
and in the battle of Franklin, which could not have been mine if I
had not stood next to Schofield in the corps, it will be seen that
for me it was the practical loss of a grade, as it would have been
for General Wood in the Fourth Corps if General Couch had remained
there. My only purpose in noting these things is to make
intelligible the feeling in the army that such transfers are not
good administration, except where they are in the nature of
promotion for brilliant service. The feeling was also strong that
the loss of one's footing in one large army, unless caused by
exceptional reasons, fully understood, is a reason against a
transfer to another, where, in generous rivalry, all have been
striving to merit advanced instead of diminished grades. In justice
to General Schofield, however, I must not omit to say that he fully
appreciated my situation, and with an earnestness which outran
anything I could claim, exerted himself to secure my promotion and
to make me eligible to the permanent assignment to the corps'
command when his own authority was afterward enlarged. General
Couch's position was by no means a desirable one for him; for he
could not be ignorant of the sentiment of the army, and he would
probably have preferred a division in the Potomac Army to one in
ours, for there in spite of a temporary eclipse, he had a fixed and
honorable reputation which would justify a reasonable expectation of
regaining prominence in it. [Footnote: In the spring of 1863 General
Couch was the senior corps commander in the Army of the Potomac, and
as such was nominally in command on the field in the battle of
Chancellorsville during the temporary disability of General Hooker.
Shortly after that battle he asked to be transferred to some other
command, and was assigned to the Department of the Susquehanna in
Pennsylvania, where the duty was merely administrative. In reducing
these organizations in the fall of 1864, he became a supernumerary.
See Walker's Second Army Corps, pp. 234, 235.]

Without going into a narration of the battle of Nashville, it may be
worth while to remark that the publication of the official records
increases the importance of the absence of Forrest's cavalry, which
gave the opportunity for an almost unopposed advance of Thomas's
right in the manoeuvres of the 15th December to turn Hood's flank.
We had known that Chalmers, one of Forrest's division commanders,
had been sent to cover the four miles of space intervening between
the left of the Confederate line and the river. [Footnote: "March to
the Sea, Nashville," etc., pp. 107, 114.] Chalmers' report now tells
us that he had only Colonel Rucker's brigade with him, the rest of
the division having been sent to the other flank. He asserts that,
after leaving one regiment on the Granny White turnpike in immediate
touch with the infantry line, he had only 900 men left. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. i. p. 765.] With so small a force
he, of course, could hardly do more than observe and report the
advance of our three cavalry divisions. Coleman's brigade of
infantry which had held the Hillsborough and Hardin turnpikes was
recalled to the main line early in the day, [Footnote: Walthall's
Report, Official Records, vol. xiv. pt. i p. 722] and as it moved
away without his knowledge, Chalmers, on learning it, supposed it
was driven back. It left uncovered the cavalry baggage train on the
Hardin turnpike, which was captured by part of Colonel Coon's
brigade of our horse. [Footnote: Chalmers' Report. _Id_., p. 765;
Coon's Report, _Id_., p. 589.] Chalmers then took Rucker's brigade
to the Hillsborough turnpike so as to cover more closely the
infantry flank, and left only one regiment to delay the advance of
our cavalry on the roads nearer the river.

[Illustration: Map: Battle of Nashville.]

During the night of the 15th and the morning of the 16th the
movement of Cheatham's corps to Hood's left had been observed by
both our infantry and our cavalry. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlv. pt. ii. pp. 217, 224.] As part of these troops had been seen
marching northward on the Granny White turnpike, Schofield very
naturally took into consideration the probability of their being new
reinforcements coming to Hood from the rear. [Footnote: _Id_., p.
214.] The extension of the enemy's fortified line to our right had
made it necessary to extend my division in single line without
reserves, and even then they were stretched almost to the
breaking-point. [Footnote: Cox's Report, _Id_., pt. i. p. 407.]
Thomas began his inspection of the line at Wood's position on the
left in the forenoon, and came westward visiting the commands in
turn. [Footnote: Wood's Report, _Id_., p. 131; A. J. Smith's Report,
_Id_., p. 435; "Franklin and Nashville," p. 118; Schofield's
"Forty-six Years in the Army," p. 246.]

At ten o'clock in the morning Wilson had most of his cavalry
"refused, on the right of Schofield, the line extending across and
perpendicular to the Hillsborough turnpike." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 220. In the dispatch quoted, the name
is given "Murfreesborough" by a manifest clerical error. Schofield's
right was near the Hillsborough turnpike, the Murfreesborough
turnpike being beyond the other flank of the whole army.] A regiment
had been sent to try to reach the Granny White turnpike, but had
been driven off and reported Cheatham's infantry moving to the left
upon it. [Footnote: _Id_., p. 224.] Wilson reported this to
Schofield, adding, "The country on the left of the Hillsborough
pike, toward the enemy's left, is too difficult for cavalry
operations. It seems to me if I was on the other flank of the army I
might do more to annoy the enemy, unless it is intended that I shall
push out as directed last night." [Footnote; _Id_., p. 216. See also
Schofield's "Forty-six Years," p. 244.] Schofield acknowledged the
receipt of this information at 11.15, and forwarded it to General
Thomas. In view of the apparent concentration of the enemy's forces
in his front, he advised Wilson, until he should receive other
orders from Thomas (who was then on the left with General Wood), to
hold his forces "in readiness to support the troops here, in case
the enemy makes a heavy attack." [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlv. pt. ii. p. 216. See also Schofield's "Forty-six Years," p.
244.] At half-past one his dispatch to Thomas, from his position on
the field close to my own, fixes with clearness the situation at
that hour. "Wilson is trying to push in toward the Granny White
pike, about a mile south of my right. My skirmishers on the right
are supporting him. The skirmishing is pretty heavy. I have not
attempted to advance my main line to-day, and do not think I am
strong enough to do so. Will you be on this part of the line soon?"
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 215; see also
Stiles's Report, _Id_., pt. i. p. 431.]

In a letter written in 1882, to assist me when preparing to write my
account of the battle of Nashville, [Footnote: "Franklin and
Nashville," etc., chap. vi.] General Schofield gave me his
recollection of the situation on our right during the morning of the
16th of December. [Footnote: Letter of June 1, 1882.] "I had gone
back to Nashville in the night preceding," he said, "to persuade
Thomas to order Wilson to remain on my right and take part in the
battle the next morning, and A. J. Smith to close up on our left.
Thomas had only partially adopted my views, and had not given Wilson
any orders to attack. I had waited impatiently all the morning, and
until some time after noon for Wilson to get orders from Thomas, or
to comply with my request to put his troops in without waiting for
orders. Finally, some time after noon, Wilson had consented to go in
with his cavalry (I relieving him of all responsibility), and I had
directed you, with your reserve brigade, which was not then in
contact with the enemy, to support Wilson or join with him in
attacking the enemy's flank." When Schofield received the proposal
from McArthur through Couch, that an assault should be made on Shy's
hill, in the angle of the enemy's line, by one of McArthur's
brigades, supported by Couch, he "became impatient," he says, "for
Wilson and Stiles [my flank brigade] to get possession of the
commanding ground to the enemy's left-rear, so as to prepare the way
for your [my] assault upon his intrenched line." [Footnote: See also
General Schofield's discussion of the events of the 16th, in his
"Forty-six Years," pp. 263-275.] The field dispatch of General Couch
in regard to supporting McArthur was dated at 2.30 P.M. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 217.]

General Schofield sought an opportunity to compare recollections
with General Wilson, and wrote me again on the 29th of June, 1882,
saying that he was greatly surprised to find that Wilson did not
recollect the proposal and request stated above, but thought that
General Thomas had come in person to his position on the
Hillsborough turnpike, and about 10 or 10:30 o'clock A.M. had given
him the orders under which he then undertook to advance against
Hood's left-rear. Wilson also associated with it the capture of a
dispatch from Hood to Chalmers, urging the latter to drive the
Yankee cavalry from his left and rear, as otherwise he could not
hold the position. This dispatch, Wilson said, he promptly sent to
Thomas. As the conference between Schofield and Wilson was for the
purpose of assisting me in getting undisputed facts for the history
of the campaign, I was permitted to know the result and to have the
contents of a letter from Wilson to Schofield of date of June 28,
1882, restating his recollection. In pursuance of my rule to avoid
as far as possible the debate of subsidiary controverted points in
my connected history, I omitted any reference to them in this
instance. General Schofield's memory is, however, so strongly
supported by the field dispatches, that it does not seem difficult
now to reach a sound historical judgment.

It is plain that during the earlier part of the day General Wilson
was reporting through General Schofield, who forwarded to General
Thomas the information received. At some time before noon the latter
had completed his examination of the position of the Fourth Corps on
the left of the army, so that General Wood was at liberty to ride to
General Steedman's headquarters on the Nolensville turnpike.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol xlv. pt. i. p. 131.] Thomas passed
westward to General Smith's headquarters at the centre, where he
seems still to have been at three o'clock, [Footnote: _Id_., p.
435.] or at the time of the arrangement between McArthur and Couch,
which the latter places at half-past two. [Footnote: _Id_., pt. ii.
p. 217.] Thomas then visited General Schofield's position, where he
was when the final assault was made and the enemy routed. General
Wilson's reports make no mention of a visit from General Thomas on
the 16th, and the contents of his dispatches show that there had
been none up to eleven o'clock, when Thomas was with Wood on the
other flank of the whole army. It can hardly be necessary to mention
the extreme improbability of the commander's omission to visit
Schofield's quarters near the Hillsborough turnpike, if he were
going by that road to Wilson, who was also on it. We must conclude
that General Wilson is mistaken in his recollection. That he saw
General Thomas at Schofield's position late in the day, is conceded
by all. [Footnote: The account in "Franklin and Nashville," etc., p.
119, must be modified in accord with the facts above stated.]

We find no mention in the records of any capture of an important
dispatch from Hood to Chalmers, except that found on the person of
Colonel Rucker, when he was wounded and captured at 6.30 P.M.,
trying to hold the pass of the Brentwood hills on the Granny White
turnpike, in the darkness, two hours after the collapse of Hood's
line. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 218.] This
dispatch seems to have strongly resembled the language used by
Wilson in his letter to Schofield in 1882. It is said to have stated
that Chalmers' cavalry must take care of this flank. In sending the
information to General Johnson, Wilson added, "Go for him with all
possible celerity, as Hood says the safety of their army depends
upon Chalmers." [Footnote: Wilson to Johnson, Id., p. 222.] As we
have already noted, Rucker's brigade, just routed, was all there was
of Chalmers' division on that flank except a regiment covering
trains making for Franklin.

The Confederate records support this view. Chalmers' report relates
the skirmishing during the morning in which Rucker was holding the
Hillsborough turnpike against Wilson, and the attempt on our side to
move to the Granny White turnpike, from which Hammond's detachment
was driven back. He says that with one regiment and his own escort
he "held the enemy in check for more than three hours." [Footnote:
_Id._, pt. i. p. 765.] This agrees very well with the situation as
indicated in General Schofield's dispatch of 1.30 P.M., when a
serious effort was making on our side to reach that road. Chalmers
reported the fact that the regiment was hotly beset, and Hood's
adjutant-general, in acknowledging it at 3.15 P.M., said, "Your
dispatch, saying you were fighting the enemy with one regiment on
the Granny White pike, received. General Hood says you must hold
that pike; put in your escort and every available man you can find."
[Footnote: _Id._, pt. ii. p. 697.] Chalmers reports that he received
this about 4.30, when the regiment had been driven back; that he
then moved up Rucker's brigade, which had reached the same turnpike
nearer Brentwood, and after a sharp struggle it was routed. "By this
time," he adds, "it was so dark that it was impossible to re-form
the men, or, indeed, to distinguish friend from foe, so closely were
they mingled together." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlv. pt.
i. p. 766.] It was in this _melee_ that Rucker was wounded and
captured.

In preparation for the attack in concert with A. J. Smith's command,
my flank brigade (Stiles's), which had been in echelon on our right,
was ordered to swing forward in touch with our cavalry advance.
[Footnote: My Report, _Id_., p. 407.] My own main attack was to be
upon the bastion which made the flank of the enemy's works before
us. I ordered Doolittle's brigade to charge straight at it.
Casement's brigade, on Doolittle's left, was to march by the right
flank at double-quick in rear of Doolittle, so as to become a second
line to him and support the advance as might be necessary. The
skirmishers of Stiles's brigade had accompanied the cavalry advance
since half-past one, and in the final effort his troops in line were
to take part as already stated. [Footnote: See Schofield to Thomas,
1.30 P. M., _Id_., pt. ii. p. 215; Stiles's Report, _Id_., pt. i. p.
431; my own Report, _Id_., p. 407, and sketch map accompanying the
latter, _Id_., p. 408; also "Franklin and Nashville," etc., pp.
119-122.] After personal conference with my brigade commanders to
insure complete mutual understanding, I rode to the hill in rear of
my lines where Thomas and Schofield were together, [Footnote: Marked
2 in map, p. 359.] watching for the concerted attack upon Shy's hill
in the salient angle of Hood's lines.

When Smith's men were seen to reach the summit of Shy's Hill, I
received the signal from Schofield, and galloped down the hill
toward Doolittle; but he also had caught sight of the movement, and
his brigade was already charging on the run when I reached him. The
excited firing of the enemy was too high, and Doolittle's men
entered the works with very little loss. The collapse was general.
As soon as we were over the works, I was ordered to stand fast with
my command and give General Smith's command the right of way down
the Granny White turnpike. Doolittle's brigade had carried the
bastion in front of our right and the curtain adjoining it, and his
line halted immediately in rear of these, partly facing the
turnpike. He had captured a four-gun battery of light twelves in the
bastion and another of the same number in the curtain, with the
artillerists and part of the supports. [Footnote: See the official
reports cited above, and special reports as to the guns, Official
Records, vol. xlv. pt. ii. pp. 234, 235; also regimental reports,
Twelfth Kentucky, _Id_., pt. i. p. 417, One Hundredth Ohio, _Id_.,
p. 420, and Eighth Tennessee, _Id_., p. 423.] Stiles, advancing with
the cavalry, was halted a short distance in front of Doolittle,
facing southward on the right of the turnpike. Casement was halted
in the trenches from which Doolittle had started. [Footnote:
Casement's Report, _Id_., pt. i. p. 425. All the reports on the
National side except that of the cavalry refer to the concerted
attack on Shy's hill as the signal for the general advance. The
Confederate reports also speak of the carrying of that salient as
the cause of the rout. In his second report, dated Feb. 1, 1865, and
in his letter to General Schofield in 1882, cited above, General
Wilson says that it was on his personal report of what his men were
doing on the enemy's left rear that Thomas ordered the final
assault.]