CAMPAIGN IN NORTH CAROLINA--CAPTURE OF WILMINGTON

Rendezvous at Washington--Capture of Fort Fisher--Schofield ordered
to North Carolina--Grant and Schofield visit Terry--Department of
North Carolina--Army of the Ohio in the field--Correspondence of
Grant and Sherman--Sherman conscious of his risks but hopeful of
great results--His plan of march from Savannah--Relation of
Wilmington to New Berne--Our arrival at Washington--The Potomac
frozen--Peace conference at Fort Monroe--Interview with Mr.
Stanton--The thirteenth amendment of the Constitution--Political
excitement at the capital--A little dinner-party--Garfield, H. W.
Davis, and Schenck--Davis on Lincoln--Destination of our
army--Embarkation--Steamship "Atlantic"--Visit to Fort Monroe--The
sea-voyage--Cape Fear Inlet--General Terry's lines--Bragg the
Confederate commander--Reconnoitring his lines--The colored
troops--"Monitor" engaged with Fort Anderson--Alternate
plans--Marching on Wilmington by the west bank of the river--My
column opposite the town--Orders not applicable to the
situation--Difficulty of communication--Use of
discretion--Wilmington evacuated--A happy result.

On Thursday the 26th of January, 1865, I received a telegram from
General Schofield directing me to join my command without delay, and
I started from my home in northern Ohio the same evening. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 131.] I had spent a week in
a delightful visit with my family after two years of absence from
them, and had been rapidly improving in health. The growing faith
that the campaign of the winter and spring would end in complete
victory for the national arms created an ardent zeal to be about it
and to have an active hand in the final scenes. Our orders had
indicated Annapolis as our port of rendezvous, and our destination
the Army of the Potomac in front of Petersburg. [Footnote: _Id._,
vol. xlv. pt. ii. pp. 529, 586.] On reaching Annapolis Junction in
the night of the 28th, I learned that my division was in Washington,
and followed it, arriving there in the morning of the 29th.
[Footnote: To get an adequate idea of the task of transporting an
army corps so great a distance, one should look at Colonel Parsons's
report, including 250 dispatches. Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt.
ii. pp. 215-284.]

The change from Annapolis to Washington and Alexandria had been made
by Grant upon a suggestion of General Halleck that there was no
shelter at Annapolis for such a body of troops, whilst there was
enough at the capital. As the winter weather was then severe, this
thoughtfulness saved the command much suffering. [Footnote: _Id_.,
vol. xlv. pt. ii. p. 596.] The military situation had also changed
materially by the capture of Fort Fisher on the North Carolina
coast, on the very day we embarked on the transports at Clifton
(January 15th). This capture by the forces under General A. H. Terry
was one step in the preparation of a new base for Sherman in his
march northward through the Carolinas, and Grant was most anxious
that it should be followed by the occupation of Wilmington. His
desire to strengthen his own army was made secondary to his
determination to make Sherman's movement an assured success. He
wrote to Sherman on the 21st that he would send Schofield to
Wilmington, if, as was rumored, the fall of that place had followed
the capture of Fort Fisher. [Footnote: _Id_., vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p.
102.] On the 24th he had made up his mind to send Schofield there
anyhow, and was going himself to inspect the fort and the situation
at the mouth of Cape Fear River. He telegraphed for Schofield to
join him on this visit to Terry, and the outline of the new campaign
was then arranged. A new department of North Carolina was decided
upon, Schofield was to command it, his army in the field to consist
of two provisional corps besides the Twenty-third, of which Terry
was to command one, and the other for a time fell to me. This field
force was to retain our old title of the Army of the Ohio. On
Schofield's recommendation the brevet rank of major-general was
given to General Ruger, and that of brigadier to Colonel Henderson
of the One Hundred and Twelfth Illinois, for services at Franklin.
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. pp. 121, 179, 190,
201.] Sherman had heard of the fall of Fort Fisher before he broke
his communications with Savannah, and was assured of a new base
there, even if the line from New Berne to Goldsborough should not be
opened.

The correspondence between Sherman and Grant at this time is very
characteristic of both men, and throws a bright light on their
unselfish friendship and their earnest purpose to bring the war to a
successful end without rest or delay. In his letter of the 21st of
January, after giving the latest details of his situation, Sherman
adds: "I am told that Congress meditates a bill to make another
lieutenant-general for me. I have written to John Sherman to stop it
if it is designed for me. [Footnote: See Sherman Letters, p. 245.]
It would be mischievous, for there are enough rascals who would try
to sow differences between us, whereas you and I now are in perfect
understanding. I would rather have you in command than anybody else,
for you are fair, honest, and have at heart the same purpose that
should animate all. I should emphatically decline any commission
calculated to bring us into rivalry, and I ask you to advise all
your friends in Congress to this effect, especially Mr. Washburne. I
doubt if men in Congress fully realize that you and I are honest in
our professions of want of ambition. I know that I feel none, and
to-day will gladly surrender my position and influence to any other
who is better able to wield the power. The flurry attending my
recent success will soon blow over and give place to new
developments." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p.
103. In the same letter Sherman referred to the farewell order
General Butler had addressed to his troops on being relieved of
command. "I am rejoiced that Terry took Fisher," Sherman said,
"because it silences Butler, who was to you a dangerous man. His
address to his troops on being relieved was a direct, mean, and
malicious attack on you, and I admired the patience and skill by
which you relieved yourself and the country of him." In the address
referred to, Butler had said: "I have been chary of the precious
charge confided to me. I have refused to order the useless sacrifice
of the lives of such soldiers, and I am relieved from your command.
The wasted blood of my men does not stain my garments." (O. R, vol.
xlvi. pt. ii. p. 71.) Such a publication made its author liable to
court-martial, but Grant took no public notice of it, except to
oppose his further assignment to duty. _Id_., vol. xlvii. pt. ii.
pp. 537, 562. See also Sherman to Admiral Porter, _Id_., p. 104, and
Grant to Sherman, _Id_., p. 859.]

Replying on the 1st of February, Grant said: "I have received your
very kind letter, in which you say you would decline, or are opposed
to, promotion. No one would be more pleased at your advancement than
I, and if you should be placed in my position and I put subordinate,
it would not change our relations in the least. I would make the
same exertions to support you that you have ever done to support me,
and I would do all in my power to make our cause win." [Footnote:
_Id_., p. 193.]

That Sherman knew his campaign in the Carolinas would involve great
risks, and had no blind confidence in his fortune, was shown by his
reply to the well-known letter of congratulation which President
Lincoln sent him upon the surrender of Savannah: [Footnote: _Id_.,
vol. xliv. p. 809, and Sherman's Memoirs, vol. ii. p. 166.] "The
motto 'Nothing venture, nothing win,' which you refer to, is most
appropriate, and should I venture too much and happen to lose, I
shall bespeak your charitable inference." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 18.]

In writing to Grant also, on the 29th of January, in a very full and
interesting letter, he said: "I expect Davis will move Heaven and
earth to catch me, for success to my column is fatal to his dream of
empire. Richmond is not more vital to his cause than Columbia and
the heart of South Carolina." [Footnote: _Id_., p. 155.]

[Illustration: Map: Northeast Georgia / South Carolina border area]

The general plan which he adopted was to threaten both Charleston
and Augusta with the wings of his army, keeping the enemy in doubt
as to his purpose as long as possible, whilst he pushed his centre
rapidly toward Columbia. He had no mind to waste time in serious
operations against Charleston, for he knew that it must fall when
his advance threatened to cut it off from communication with
Richmond. From Columbia he planned to march on Raleigh by way of
Goldsborough, the last-named place being connected by railroad with
both Wilmington and New Berne, and being therefore the objective of
General Schofield's movements from both seaports. Beaufort, the
harbor of New Berne, was deeper than the mouth of Cape Fear River,
and was therefore to be made the principal base of supply for
Sherman when he should enter North Carolina; but Wilmington was so
much further south that prudence required it to be first occupied
and provisioned to give Sherman temporary supply, if any contingency
should make it necessary to him before the railroad from New Berne
to Goldsborough could be rebuilt. These subsidiary operations in
North Carolina were to be our special task. [Footnote: For connected
historical treatment of Sherman's march northward, and of the
capture of Fort Fisher, see "March to the Sea," etc., chaps,
viii.-xi.: Life of Sherman (Great Commanders' Series), chap. xii.]

On reaching Washington, I found that my troops were just arriving on
trains from the West. They were temporarily placed in barracks in
the city, till the fleet of transports should be ready. The unusual
severity of the winter had frozen the Potomac, and Annapolis was
also blocked with ice, so that the quartermaster's department had to
wait two or three days for a change of weather, before fixing the
point of departure. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii.
p. 154.] The time passed pleasantly for me, since it gave me the
opportunity of renewing old acquaintance with public men, and of
observing for myself the spirit which animated political circles at
the capital. Mr. Lincoln with Mr. Seward had gone to Fort Monroe to
meet Mr. Stephens and others, commissioned by the Richmond
government to confer informally as to the possibilities of peace.
The Confederate officials were at Grant's headquarters on the 1st of
February, "very desirous of going to Washington to see Mr. Lincoln,"
as the General-in-Chief wrote Sherman incidentally. From his
interview with them, Grant was convinced that "the peace feeling
within the rebel lines is gaining ground rapidly," but he added,
"This, however, should not relax our energies in the least, but
should stimulate us to greater activity." [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 194.]

Going to pay my respects to Secretary Stanton at the War Department,
I was met by him in an exceedingly cordial way, and in parting,
after an interesting visit, he congratulated me on my promotion,
saying I owed nobody any thanks for it, as it had been fully and
fairly won. I owe it to him to mention this, for so much was current
about the brusqueness of his intercourse with army officers, that he
is entitled to the testimony that, on this as on all other occasions
when I met him personally, nothing could be kinder or more
considerate than his manner to me.

My visit to Washington happened to include the day on which the
constitutional amendment abolishing slavery passed the House.
Breakfasting with Chief-Justice Chase, I met also Henry Ward
Beecher, and the great historical event was, of course, the central
subject of conversation. The forecast by such men of the effect upon
the country and upon the world made a blending of solid wisdom with
brilliant eloquence not to be forgotten. My friend Governor Dennison
was Postmaster-General, and in his house I had full opportunity to
judge of the keen, almost feverish interest with which public men
and leading citizens were following the rapid march of both military
and civil affairs. Coming, as I was, out of the rough winter
campaign of the West for a brief halt in the centre of political
activity, before sailing to the swamp-lined shores of Carolina,
there was something almost unreal, though fascinating, in the
contrast of the excitement of the field with the totally different
but scarcely less absorbing excitement which I saw in every face.

Garfield arranged a little dinner at which, besides himself, I met
General Schenck and Henry Winter Davis, all of them playing leading
roles in the House of Representatives. We four were alone, and it
was a rare opportunity for me to hear unrestrained discussion of
everything in public affairs. Nearly every phase of current
political and military events was treated in brilliant and trenchant
criticism, and the conversation turned at last upon the peace
conference going on at Fort Monroe. Mr. Davis was a Marylander, who
was second to none in uncompromising loyalty to the Union, and had
an acknowledged pre-eminence in eloquent advocacy of the National
cause. He, however, did not understand or appreciate Mr. Lincoln,
and in the celebrated "Wade and Davis manifesto" of the previous
year, had opposed the re-election of the President. He now let loose
in a witty and scathing denunciation of Lincoln and all his works.
The current epithets among the President's opponents, of which
"baboon" was one of the mildest, were flung at him with a venom
that, to me, was half shocking and half comical. The soldier habit
of making the Hurrah for Lincoln our answering war-cry to the Hurrah
for Davis of our enemies in the field, made a bewildering puzzle of
such an outburst. The meeting with the Southern commissioners was
denounced as a weak compromising of our cause. He saw no force in
the argument that weak hearts among us would be strengthened when
they saw that now as upon former overtures the Confederate
authorities insisted upon independence as the necessary condition of
peace, whilst Mr. Lincoln stood firmly for restoration of the Union
and abolition of slavery as the essentials. The curious fact was
that such a man, ably busied for four years in political
co-operation with the President, living in the same city, in
frequent personal contact with him, had utterly failed to measure
his character and his intellect, or to get even a glimmering idea of
what lay beneath that ungraceful exterior and that quaint and
humorous speech. The elegant orator and polished man of the world
felt no magnetism but that of repulsion; and his senses were so
dulled by it that he never guessed the wisdom and the breadth, the
subtle policy and the deep statesmanship, the luminous insight and
the unfaltering purpose which now seem writ so plain in Lincoln's
words and deeds.

General Schenck did not appear to differ greatly from Davis, but
what he said was in short, trenchant sentences, interjected from
time to time. Garfield treated the outburst as a sort of
extravaganza, and in his position as host did not seriously debate,
but rallied his friend with good-humored persiflage, met his
outbursts with jovial laughter and prodded him to fresh explosions
by shafts of wit. It was a strange and not altogether exhilarating
experience for me; but I had afterward to learn that the belittling
view of Lincoln was the common one among public men in Washington.
The people at a distance got a juster perspective, and knowing him
by his written papers and his public acts, divined him better and
gave him a loyal support hardly to be distinguished from their
devotion to the cause of the country itself. We may fairly conclude
that the failure of so many men near the President to understand him
is not creditable to their sagacity; but we must also admit that a
first impression and a superficial view would in his case be almost
surely misleading, and that to correct it would take better
opportunities for an intimate study of the man than most public men
would have, and most would not care to seek them. The belittling
view of men in power fits best our self-esteem.

As soon as General Schofield got back from his trip to Fort Fisher
with Grant, he had issued his orders for our movement which was to
take place as soon as the ice would permit our transports to enter
or leave the harbors on Chesapeake Bay and the Potomac. My own
division was to take the lead and sail to Cape Fear River. Couch's
would come next and land at Beaufort for operations on the New Berne
line. Ruger's (the new troops) would sail last, and find orders at
Fort Monroe in going down the bay, deciding whether its destination
should be Wilmington or Beaufort. [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlvii. pt. ii. p. 135.] Meagher's provisional division of
detachments belonging to Sherman's army was temporarily attached to
us, for it was too late to join Sherman by way of Savannah. Meagher
had ordered it to rendezvous at New York, but Grant changed its
destination to Washington with the purpose just stated. Its
commander had gone on to New York in advance without any
understanding with army headquarters, and the convivial and
unsystematic Irishman thereby fell into trouble. [Footnote: _Id._,
pp. 116, 119, 126, 204, 293.]

On Thursday the 2d of February, General Schofield was able to issue
his final orders for embarkation. Only vessels enough for two
brigades of my division had been able to reach Alexandria, and
Casement's brigade was sent by rail to Annapolis to take ship there
and to be followed immediately by Meagher's provisional command.
[Footnote: _Id._, p. 213.] Friday was spent in getting troops on
board the ships at Annapolis and systematizing their accommodation
for the voyage. One of our transports was the "Atlantic," Captain
Gray, which, as the crack ship of the Collins Line of New York and
Liverpool packets, had led the van of the ocean greyhounds in the
days of wooden hulls and side-wheels. General Schofield and myself
made our headquarters on this ship. On each of the other vessels the
senior officer was made responsible for all the troops on board, and
was confidentially authorized, after it should enter Chesapeake Bay,
to instruct the master of the ship to make the best of his way to
Cape Fear Inlet as the rendezvous for the division. [Footnote:
_Id._, p. 293.] General Grant had asked the War Department to
arrange for a patrol of the coast by the navy during the transit of
Schofield's little army. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 284.]

On Saturday the 4th we had expected to start at daybreak, but a
heavy fog delayed us. When it lifted, we made our way slowly down
the Potomac, the drifting ice obstructing the passage so that we
could only go at a snail's pace, backing and filling to keep in the
ice openings and to save injury to the vessel. Starting at ten
o'clock, we only reached the head of Kettlebottom Shoals by
nightfall of the short winter day, making less than twenty miles.
The passage of the shoals was too dangerous for so large a vessel in
the dark, and we dropped anchor for the night. I had made it my
first task on Friday evening to have a complete understanding with
Captain Gray, and to get his suggestions as to the orders I desired
to issue for the conduct and discipline of the troops while on board
ship for which I was responsible. He was a gentleman of ability and
large experience in his profession, and co-operated with me so
cordially that our week on board the "Atlantic" was a most
comfortable one, full of interest and enjoyment, though we met rough
weather outside the capes. My order was issued on Saturday and
rigidly enforced during the voyage. By Captain Gray's invitation I
made my office in his chart-room on the upper deck, enforcing
regular tours of duty for officers and men of the division, of whom
nearly 2000 were on board. In the intervals, when the captain was
not himself on the bridge, we exchanged stories of our very
different experiences, and I found his conversation both interesting
and instructive. We had besides, of course, the large circle of
comrades and old friends in the cabin, and for those who escaped
sea-sickness the hours never hung heavy. [Footnote: As the Records
do not seem to contain many orders for the conduct of troops on
transport ships, I insert that which I made for this voyage. It was,
of course, supplemental to the Army Regulations of 1863, chap,
xxxvii.

"Special Orders

No. 9.

HEADQUARTERS, THIRD DIV., 23D ARMY CORPS,
Steamship Atlantic, February 4, 1865.

The following regulations will be strictly observed by the officers
and men of this command during the present voyage:

1. No open lights will be allowed in any part of the ship occupied
by troops. The ship's lanterns will be arranged by the officers of
the vessel in such a way as to light the decks during the night, and
will not be opened or interfered with by the men.

2. No smoking will be allowed in any part of the vessel used for
sleeping except the open decks. The men may smoke in the open air
upon the upper decks, and the brigade commander will provide for
giving proper airing, and opportunity to smoke, to the men quartered
below. Officers will smoke, either upon deck or in the smoking-room
near the water-closets.

3. The division and brigade commissaries will make arrangements with
the steward of the ship for cooking the men's coffee and doing other
necessary cooking for the command, and for serving the same out at
regular hours.

4. The canteens of the men may be filled with drinking water once
each day, the men being marched by companies under their proper
officers to the pump in the fore part of the ship for that purpose.

5. The brigade commander, in consultation with the commander of the
ship, will arrange for the perfect policing of the quarters, sinks,
etc.

6. The starboard side of the upper and main decks abaft of the
engine, will be kept clear of men and reserved for the use of
officers, both of the command and of the ship, during the day; and
such portion of this space as may necessarily be occupied by the men
for sleeping at night, will have a passage kept entirely clear for
the use of the officers and crew of the vessel in working her at
night. No men will at any time be allowed to go upon the roofs of
the houses on the upper deck.

7. Proper roll-calls will be established, and the line officers will
be strictly required to attend them, and to make close personal
inspections daily of the condition of their men, and to be
personally in command of them when marched out for water, or coffee,
or when on duty.

8. An officer of the day will be daily appointed by the brigade
commander, and shall have full charge of the execution of this
order, and supervision of all the police arrangements of the
command. Proper line officers will be detailed on guard duty, and
sentries will be regularly posted at the bulkhead of the ship
storeroom on the forward lower deck, at the sinks, over the lights
at night, and on the middle line of the decks reserved under
paragraph six.

9. The officer of the day, after reporting at brigade headquarters
each day, will report to the captain of the ship, in order that the
ship's officers may know to whom to apply for any enforcement of
these regulations.

By command of Major-General Cox.

(Signed) THEO. Cox,
Capt. and Ass't Adj't-General."

Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 303.]

Weighing anchor at daybreak on Sunday morning, we passed Kettle
Bottom Shoals safely, and found much more open water in the lower
river. The day was mild and calm, and we made good progress to Fort
Monroe, where we stopped in the evening to take on board a supply of
ammunition. While this work was going on, I took advantage of the
opportunity to land in a small boat and pass through the place by
moonlight. As one of the largest and most important of the
fortresses of the old style, with heavy walls of masonry, casemated,
and with regular moat, it was an interesting study to a soldier, and
all the more so as we were then in the full heat of the discussion
of the relative value of such formal works compared with mere
earthworks, of which Fort Fisher, to which we were bound, was a very
striking example. It was admitted that modern ordnance could soon
knock the walls into a rubbish-heap, but Fort Sumter had raised the
supplementary debate, whether the rubbish-heap did not begin a new
chapter in the defence, longer and more important than the first
period of attack.

As soon as the ammunition was on board and properly stowed, our
voyage was resumed, and at daybreak we had passed out of Chesapeake
Bay, joining our consorts of the transport fleet near Cape Henry,
and were running down the coast along the even line of keys which
lie as a breastwork against the Atlantic Ocean outside of the much
indented coast proper of North Carolina. The wind was moderate and
off shore, so that Captain Gray laid his course straight for Cape
Hatteras, with only offing enough to keep in a good depth of
water,--say fifteen or twenty miles. At intervals during the day we
could see isolated clumps of pine-trees rising out of the water,
like low-lying, blue clouds, so that we could hardly say that we
were wholly out of sight of land. We passed Cape Hatteras late in
the afternoon, about sunset, and as the coast now trends much more
to the westward, with concave lines from Hatteras to Cape Lookout
(near Beaufort), and from Lookout to Cape Fear, our course took us
farther out to sea. I woke on Tuesday morning to find the ship
pitching heavily and heavy rain sounding loud on the deck over my
head, driven by gusts of wind. Doubts as to the reliability of my
"sea legs" made me prudently keep my berth till about ten o'clock,
when I went on deck to find a [Illustration: [map of south-central
North Carolina at the South Carolina border]] dense fog and a high
running sea. The rain had ceased, but the succeeding fog was a worse
obstacle to navigation. We were nearly at our destination, and were
feeling our way slowly along. My "doubts" vanished in the fresh air,
and the bit of real seafaring was exhilarating. Most of the cabin
passengers, however, failed to show themselves on deck, and the
soldiers and officers whom duty kept there did not all enjoy it
greatly. The recruiting regulations, just then, allowed transfers to
the gunboat service of soldiers who had any experience even in
inland navigation, and the impulse to change had made the subject a
"burning question," even while we were in the West The inveterate
practical jokers now had their opportunity, and a man leaning
uneasily over the lee rail was sure to be offered the chance to
enlist in the navy, with glowing eulogies of its superior comfort
compared with marching in the mud. In the middle of the afternoon we
dropped anchor in nine fathoms, but toward evening the fog lifted,
and we ran further in, anchoring in seven fathoms, about a mile off
the shore. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. p. 927.]
Fort Fisher was abreast of us, on Federal Point, its big parapet
looking like a long, low hill, with knobs upon it, rising from the
beach of glittering white sand against a background of the pine
forest. Admiral Porter's fleet lay at their moorings all around us,
a few of the lighter vessels having crossed the bar and run into the
mouth of Cape Fear River behind the fort, where the river channel
was nearly parallel to the sea beach and less than a mile from it.
We were at New Inlet, between Federal Point and Smith Island, or
rather the long, narrow key which runs northward from the island.
Cape Fear is the sharp southern point of Smith Island, some seven
miles south of where we lay, and the old entrance was south and west
of the cape, between the island and the mainland. [Footnote: See
official Atlas, pl. cxxxix.]

The landing of the troops was a difficult task, for the roughness of
the sea made it impossible for another vessel to lie alongside the
transports, and we had to resort to the slow and somewhat dangerous
method of transferring the men from the ships to a light-draft
steamer in the ship's small boats. A little wharf was on the inner
side of Federal Point, but there the water was so shallow that even
the light-draft propeller could not get to the wharf, and another
transfer had to be made. Crossing the bar could only be done at high
water or near it, and the time for work was consequently so much
shortened that the whole of the 8th and 9th was used in landing the
division. At sunset of the 9th the sea went down enough for the
propeller to come alongside; the headquarters tents and baggage were
transferred to her, and we took leave of the good ship "Atlantic."
By the time this transfer was made, the tide was too low to let us
pass in over the bar, and we had to pass the night on the dirty
propeller, lying outside till eight o'clock of Friday the 10th, when
we ran in at high tide, and after the second transfer resumed our
character of land forces on the sandy shore of North Carolina. All
the saddle horses of the command were, however, upon a freight ship
that did not arrive for several days, and mounted officers who had
lived in the saddle for years found it slow and tiresome work to
wade on foot through the soft sands in the performance of military
duty.

General Terry with his forces was holding a line across Federal
Point about two miles above Fort Fisher, [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. p. 910.] and I directed my own troops to
encamp a little in rear of Terry's line. My own quartermaster
arranged with the chief of that department on the ground to send our
headquarters tents and baggage with the division. Meanwhile, taking
the little river steamboat which had made our final transfer to the
shore, I visited General Schofield, who had his headquarters
temporarily on the steamer "Spaulding," assigned to the medical
department for hospital use, but which at the time had no sick or
wounded on board. Like myself, he was for the nonce dismounted, and
as he was contemplating movements up both sides of Cape Fear River,
some means of ready communication with both banks was a necessity.
With him I visited Admiral Porter on the flag-ship "Malvern," and a
movement for next day, the 11th, was arranged. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. p. 927.]

[Illustration: Map]

General Bragg was in command of the Confederate Department of North
Carolina, to which he was assigned when General Lee, being made by
law general-in-chief of the army, superseded him in the similar
duties he had been performing by appointment of President Davis.
Bragg's headquarters were at Wilmington. [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. pp. 1088, 1099.] Hoke's division was
mostly in intrenchments across Federal Point about four miles above
Fort Fisher, his right resting at Sugar-loaf Hill on the left bank
of the river, and his left near the lower end of Myrtle Sound.
Opposite Sugar-loaf, at Old Brunswick, was Fort Anderson, a strong
earthwork with ten pieces of heavy ordnance, garrisoned by General
Hagood with his brigade of two thousand men. [Footnote: Official
Atlas, pl. cxxxii.; Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 911,
1077.] The channel of the river was obstructed by torpedoes and
other defensive devices. The enemy's fortifications on Smith Island
and near Smithville had been abandoned when Fort Fisher fell,
opening the way into the river above them.

On board the "Malvern" it was arranged that a monitor and other
vessels of the fleet which could cross the bar should ascend the
river and engage Fort Anderson, whilst Terry's troops, supported by
my division, should make a strong reconnoissance of Hoke's lines
and, if they were found to be strongly held, establish counter lines
near them, so that most of the forces could then be used for
flanking operations. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 958.] Returning to my
command, I found it encamped as had been ordered, and our
headquarters tents in comfortable shape by the zealous labors of our
servants aided by the headquarters guard. General Terry kindly sent
over four horses as a mount for myself and my most necessary staff
officers in the movement to begin in the morning. One of the first
questions a soldier asks in regard to his camping-place is, Where is
water to be got? One's first impression would be that on this flat
tongue of sand covered only with a sparse growth of pines and scrub
live-oak, with the ocean on one side and a tidal river on the other,
fresh water would be scarce and brackish. But we were agreeably
disappointed to find that near us, in the middle of the sands, was a
juniper swamp and pond of which the water was sweet and wholesome,
though from the juniper roots it had the bright brown color of
coffee.

On the 11th the movement was made as planned. Hoke's outposts and
pickets were driven from their rifle-pits, and his main line at
Sugar-loaf well reconnoitred. Terry's new line was established
within small-arm range of the enemy and intrenched so that Hoke
might be obliged to hold his own position in force. In the advance I
was much interested in observing the conduct of the colored troops
in General Paine's division, for I had never before seen them in
action. They were well disciplined and well led, and went forward
with alacrity in capital form, showing that they were good soldiers.
I rode well forward purposely to watch their skirmishers, and was
greatly pleased to see the pace they took and the lively way in
which they followed up the Confederate outposts when once these were
started.

When the new position was taken up, I went to the river bank, and
there, from a sand breastwork so white that it looked like a
snow-drift, I watched with my field-glass a duel between the monitor
"Montauk" and Fort Anderson. The monitor, which lay about a mile
from the fort, was of the original single-turret form, armed with
the large-calibre smooth-bores, which were fired with great
deliberation and with surprising accuracy. I could not see how any
rifled guns could have improved on their practice. The conical shot
would, of course, have excelled in penetrating power and in range,
but the big round shells seemed to be put just where the gunners
wished. A group of men stood on the deck of the monitor behind the
turret, and they frequently came out from its cover to watch the
effect of the firing, having time to step back again, between the
flash of the enemy's gun and the passing of the shot. The deck of
the monitor, being almost awash, was no mark at all for the
artillerists in the fort, and it would be the merest chance if a
ricochet shot struck it. If it did, the very low angle of impact
made it fly off without doing any harm. The turret was dented with
some centre shots, as I saw when I visited the vessel later, but it
was practically impregnable to the ordnance the Confederates used.
On the other hand, the direct fire from the ship was limited in its
effect to the displacement of earth on the parapet or the knocking
away of the cheeks of the embrasures. The body of the garrison was
kept out of range, and the artillerists were so close to the rampart
that when shells exploded over them, the fragments flew beyond and
there were few casualties.

General Terry was left to hold the new line established in face of
Hoke with Paine's division and Abbott's brigade, whilst my division
and Ames's (of Terry's command) were marched back to camp near Fort
Fisher. Schofield's own idea had been to send me with my own and
Ames's divisions across the river to operate against Fort Anderson
by the west bank and, by taking it, force the enemy to evacuate the
Sugar-loaf position opposite. By thus concentrating on the bank most
weakly held, we would by a sort of see-saw work them back till they
must give up Wilmington or fight for it in the open. I was directed
to be ready to cross the river on the 12th, but the order was
countermanded, and it was determined to try a plan which would avoid
the necessity of dividing the forces on the two sides of a large
river. Colonel Comstock of Grant's staff, who had accompanied Terry
as engineer in the taking of Fort Fisher [Footnote: Official
Records, vol. xlvi. pt. ii. p. 30.] and who was still with us, had
made a reconnoissance up the coast on the 11th, and found at Big
Hill, three miles south of Masonboro Inlet, a position from which it
seemed practicable to cover the collection and launching of enough
pontoon boats to ferry a column of troops across Myrtle Sound. If
this could be done with secrecy and speed till enough were over to
make head against the enemy while the rest were crossing, Hoke's
position would be turned and he would have to fall back upon more
open country, where our whole force could be manoeuvred against him.

On Comstock's suggestion Schofield determined to try the plan, which
was a promising one if winds and waves would permit. The navy was to
tow the boats to the place of rendezvous with a body of engineer
troops under Comstock's orders, whilst Schofield led Ames's and my
divisions by the shore. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt.
ii. pp. 403,404.] The movement was made after dark on the evening of
the 12th, but the bad weather had hardened down into a regular
northeaster, and it proved impossible to tow the pontoon boats
through the heavy sea. After a night of severe exposure we returned
to camp to find many of our tents flattened by the gale. After a
day's rest the effort was renewed on the 14th, but as the admiral
reported that the sea was too rough for even the smaller steamers to
go outside, the plan was modified so as to try drawing the boats on
their trucks, though the number of our draft animals was as yet very
small. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 426, 427.] What with the heavy surf on
the beach and the deep, soft sand beyond it, the weak teams could
not pull the trucks far, and gave out before we reached the chosen
position. As we turned back after midnight the moon was just rising,
and the scene was a wild one, with the flying clouds and the foaming
waves silvered by the moonlight; but the rarest sight was, just as
half the moon's great disk was above the horizon, a ship of war
stood against it, exactly framed in the semicircle of light as if
drawn in black on the silver surface. The plan was an interesting
one and would probably have succeeded in favorable weather, but the
winter storm forbade. [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt.
ii. p. 437.]

Then came the resumption of the original purpose, and I was assigned
to command the column advancing from Smithville up the other bank of
the river. One brigade of Couch's division (Moore's) had arrived,
and it was ordered to report to me. Ames's division was also in the
column till Fort Anderson was evacuated in the night of the 18th,
when it rejoined Terry and I moved on against the Confederate
position at Town Creek. [Footnote: _Id._, pt. i. p. 960; pt. ii. pp.
492, 493.] Ferrying the unfordable stream, Hagood's brigade was
attacked and routed on the 20th, capturing two cannon and nearly 400
prisoners, including Colonel Simonton the commandant, Hagood himself
having gone to Wilmington. [Footnote: _Id._, pp. 495, 509.] On the
21st we pressed on to Brunswick Ferry, and saved part of the pontoon
bridge there which the enemy had not been able to destroy
completely. An advance-guard was got over on Eagle Island, the large
swampy island lying in front of Wilmington, where the remnant of
Hagood's brigade held the narrow causeway. Bragg had been to
Richmond on an official visit, but was back at Wilmington and saw
that the time to evacuate had come. The naval stores were set on
fare, and the dense black pillars of smoke from the warehouses of
resin and turpentine told us the story. [Footnote: _Id._, pp.
1241-1245.]

My route from Town Creek around Mcllhenny's mill-pond to Brunswick
Ferry had taken me some three miles back from the river, and the
broad swamps and rice-fields intervening made communication with
General Schofield on the "Spaulding," very slow and difficult.
[Footnote: Official Atlas, pl. cxxxii.] The sequel well illustrates
the importance of complete confidence on the part of a subordinate
that his chief will sanction and heartily approve the use of full
discretion in circumstances where quick and full intercourse is
impossible. By long service with General Schofield, I knew that he
was no martinet, snubbing any independence of action, but an officer
of sound and calm judgment, fairly considering the reasons we might
have for any departure from the letter of an order. General Terry's
troops were facing the greater part of Hoke's division in a position
nearly opposite the mouth of Town Creek, and were meeting with
stubborn resistance. It was known that Hardee's command, having
evacuated Charleston, was moving northward to unite with the
Confederates in North Carolina, and it was supposed to aim at
reaching Wilmington. There were rumors that he had already joined
Bragg.

In these circumstances General Schofield had said to me, by a
dispatch in the morning, "If you can destroy the bridge over
Brunswick River or break the railroad to-day, do so, but be ready to
cross the river early this evening near the mouth of Town Creek."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 520] Early in
the afternoon I reported progress, saying: "My head of column
reached this place [Brunswick Ferry] about one o'clock. The rebels
had partially destroyed their pontoon bridge, but from the creek I
got several boats, and have put a regiment over on the island. They
got most of the way across, when the enemy opened with one gun,
commanding the straight road. As the rest of the island seems
impracticably swampy, this checked our reconnoissance; but there can
be little doubt the rebels are evacuating. They have made immense
fires, the smoke of which you must have seen, indicating that they
are destroying turpentine, etc. A few skirmishers were on the
opposite side of Brunswick River when we reached it, but they ran at
once. The enemy has destroyed all flatboats within reach, but I may
hunt some up. I am pushing a reconnoissance further up the river, by
way of threatening to cross above the island, and so hasten their
movements. I shall put my command in position covering the crossing
and the Georgetown road, and watch the movements, in the town. The
railroad bridge across Brunswick River is partially destroyed, and
we hear the cars on the other side of the town from here. I cannot
doubt that General Terry will have an open road in the morning, and
think from the general indications that I am entirely secure here. I
will face in all directions and get all the intelligence I can,
while awaiting orders. There is no railroad or other bridge over
Cape Fear River." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii.
p. 521.]

Whilst this report was on the road to Schofield, a messenger who
left the general about noon was slowly working his way to me,
bearing this message: "My last report from General Terry indicates
that he will not be able to force the enemy back from the position
held by him last evening. General Terry thinks Hoke has his whole
force in his front. It will therefore be necessary to transfer your
troops to the east bank of the river to-night. The men will be put
across in small boats near the mouth of Town Creek, unless Terry
succeeds in effecting a lodgment higher up. In the latter event I
will signal you. Otherwise move your troops to the mouth of Town
Creek without further orders. Let your artillery and animals go down
to Fort Anderson. I will have them sent from that place by steamers
to Federal Point this evening. If you can destroy the bridges over
Brunswick River to-day, do so; but in any event be ready to commence
crossing the river by dusk or earlier, if practicable. You might
perhaps send back a brigade or two while the others are doing the
work." [Footnote: _Ibid._]

At six o'clock, in the dusk of the evening, this letter reached me,
and I instantly replied: "Your dispatch directing movement is only
just received, the messenger having lost his way. As I am eight
miles from the mouth of Town Creek, and it is already dark, your
directions cannot be literally followed, and the circumstances
impress me so strongly with the belief that the enemy are about to
evacuate Wilmington to-night that I venture to send one brigade now
and wait further orders before withdrawing all. It will take all
night to get the whole command to Town Creek, and it seems
impossible to cross them all, beginning at an hour so much later
than you anticipated when sending the dispatch. Some engineers on
the railroad who have come into my lines, several other citizens,
and a number of slaves, all agree in reporting the intention of
evacuating immediately. The destruction of immense quantities of
property since I came up this evening looks the same way. I have
collected and repaired nearly all of the pontoons and materials of
the bridge, and had begun relaying them when your dispatch came. I
cannot retire my own force now without it appearing a retreat. I
would be entirely willing to stay here with one brigade, and should
feel quite confident that I could at any time bring it off safely,
if we remained here several days even. Thinking you would not desire
more troops at Town Creek than you can cross to-night, I ... think
it right to send the one brigade, and if more can cross, I can still
send them, so as to be not much behind the others if the messenger
makes reasonable haste. I believe I mentioned in a former dispatch
that the rebels themselves destroyed the Brunswick River railroad
bridge." [Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 522.]

The orderly who reached me had been landed from a small boat and
made his way to me on foot, and as he had eight or nine miles to
walk by a wretched road, it was not strange that he was late in
reaching me. Giving him his supper whilst I wrote my dispatch, I
then mounted him on a horse, and sent with him another mounted man
to bring the return message. My first messenger had tried to reach
the river through the swamps at several points, but had not
succeeded in getting within hailing distance of any vessels in the
stream. He happened, however, to fall in with the second messengers
in his wanderings, and was now taken to the place where a small boat
was to be sent, and so it happened that both my dispatches reached
Schofield together, but not till about half-past ten. Meanwhile, the
general having heard nothing whatever from me, and getting
unfavorable reports from Terry, wrote me again at a quarter-past
seven.

He said: "My orderlies and your signal officer seem to have got
lost, and I have heard nothing from you since 10.30 A. M. I sent an
order to you by an orderly on foot about noon, but do not feel at
all certain that it has reached you. I want you to move back abreast
of the fleet, just above the mouth of Town Creek, to-night, and be
ready to cross the river at dawn of day in the morning. Send all
your wagons and horses to Fort Anderson. The men will cross in small
boats. Better send a regiment with your wagons, horses, and
artillery. Should the enemy be in force in your front, it might be
necessary to cross Town Creek before crossing the river. About this,
act according to your judgment. I intended you to cross the river
to-night, but it is now too late." [Footnote: Official Records, vol.
xlvii. pt. ii. p. 522.]

But whilst this last orderly was on his dark and weary way to me, my
two dispatches finally got through, and at 10.20 Schofield wrote me
from the cabin of the "Spaulding" as follows: "Your dispatch of 6
P.M. is just received, and is highly satisfactory. The one of an
earlier date, but the hour not given, came at the same time. About
seven o'clock I sent another to you directing you to come back. I
hope this will reach you in time to take its place. My orders were
based on General Terry's report of an increase of the force in his
front, and that of prisoners that Hardee's forces had arrived from
Charleston. I think you would certainly have learned it if the
latter were true That you have sent one brigade back is well. You
may send another as soon as you get this dispatch. Keep the other
two where you are until daylight in the morning. Then, if the rebels
have gone, you can enter the town, taking care to hold the river
crossings. If the enemy has not gone, or you are not positive that
he is going, then move back and cross the river as before directed."
[Footnote: Official Records, vol. xlvit. pt. ii. p. 522.]

Immediately after this, Schofield wrote me another dispatch,
briefer, but of the same general purport. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 523.]
It was probably sent by way of precaution, in case any accident
happened to the bearer of the other. Arrangements had been made to
get over some horsemen so as to speed these dispatches, and they
came through to me by midnight. But meanwhile my perplexity as to my
duty was intensified. I had put over the Sixteenth Kentucky upon
Eagle Island, and made them throw up a breastwork across the
cause-way facing that of the enemy, which was near the main channel
of Cape Fear River. They were exploring the swamps, seeking
information and preparing to force the position in the morning. My
confidence in my forecast was such that I did not cease work on the
repair of the pontoons, and had the crossing ready for use late in
the evening, but awaited further orders with great anxiety. At
11.45, however, came the order dated at 7.15, reiterating the
direction to withdraw. Moore's brigade had gone under the first
order, Henderson's was waiting ready to march, and I started it for
Town Creek. [Footnote: _Id._, p. 524.] Reilly's (Colonel Sterl in
command) began to follow. The march in a dark night made it proper
to leave reasonable intervals between the brigades, and I was still
waiting with Casement's brigade, and had not destroyed the pontoon
bridge, when, at midnight, I got Schofield's dispatch of 10.20,
which had come through in less than half the time other messages had
taken, under his eager orders to force the horses through at speed.
I at once recalled Sterl, and with great satisfaction wrote to the
General, "Your dispatch of 10.20 received in time to stop two
brigades. Henderson's and Moore's have gone forward and will report
at the river above Town Creek. I will inform you of any changes in
the morning. The railroad employes who came in to me informed me
positively that Hardee's troops had not come here." [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. ii. p. 523.] My outpost on the
island was replaced, and before day dawned we knew that the last of
the enemy had disappeared from our immediate front and that
Wilmington was evacuated. Bragg had carefully removed all boats from
our side of the channel, but citizens anxious to prevent us from
firing on the town came over in skiffs, and we learned that the
Confederate forces had marched away toward Goldsborough, leaving the
way open for Terry's march into the city, which took place in the
early morning of the 22d, which we were happy to recall was
Washington's Birthday.

It has seemed worth while to give the correspondence at such length,
because it well illustrates the difficulties under which officers
must labor in war, and the necessity for a good deal of freedom of
action and of discretion in deciding upon his course, when the
commander of a detached column finds his communication with
headquarters obstructed and retarded by accidental circumstances.
Had General Schofield's methods been rigid in requiring literal
obedience, my command would have abandoned the advantages we had
gained, and the campaign might have taken quite another turn. My
complete confidence in the liberality of his judgment when the facts
should be all known, encouraged me to a course which would otherwise
have been impossible. [Footnote: In 1870 Moltke had adopted the wise
rule of leaving to subordinates of the higher grades very large
discretion, and to avoid trammelling them by detailed orders or by
prematurely communicated plans. "The very lack of instructions gave
them liberty and imposed on them the duty of acting on their own
responsibility, in case unforeseen events should require such prompt
action that orders from the Supreme Commander could not be waited
for." (Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen, Strategy, vol. i. p. 324.) It was even
looked upon as "an unwarranted censure" on the subordinate "if
anything was enjoined unnecessarily," or which was within the proper
knowledge and discretion of the officer. _Id_., vol. ii. p. 39.]
There was with me a very efficient squad of the Signal Corps, under
Lieutenant Ketchum, which had kept up flag communication with the
"Spaulding" and across the river in our advance from Smithville to
Town Creek, but when we advanced to Brunswick Ferry, Mr. Ketchum
found it impossible, on account of the course of Brunswick River and
the dense woods upon the banks, to establish any station from which
he could communicate with any of the vessels in the river below, or
with General Terry on the east bank of the Cape Fear. [Footnote:
Official Records, vol. xlvii. pt. i. pp. 915, 916.] This threw us
unexpectedly upon messengers as the only go-betweens, and led to the
embarrassments which have been described.